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munity must adopt the land use provisions as outlined above
unless it chooses to accept the federal benefit of Federal Flood
Insurance.
Second, although the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, through its Federal Insurance Adminis-
tration, publishes and monitors the land use criteria as well as
provides technical assistance to the various communities
which request such, it is the communities themselves, not the
Federal Government, which ultimately adopt the land use
criteria for their area.
These two points were the subject of recent litigation in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.21 The case,
Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Secretary of HUD,
was brought as a class action challenging the constitutional-
ity of the NFIP, particularly as it may conflict with the states'
rights of sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. Plaintiffs in
the case claimed, in essence, that the "burden" to the com-
munities (not receiving federal financial assistance) is so great if
they do not participate in the NFIP, that the program is no
longer "voluntary" but "mandatory" in nature. Further, the
plaintiffs in Texas Landowners contended that the land use
management is "federal" and therefore conflicts with the Tenth
Amendment.
Relying on the decision in National League of Cities v.
Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) where the Court held that amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act conflicted with the
state's Tenth Amendment Rights, plaintiffs were not as
successful in challenging the NFIP. The Court distinguished
National League of Cities by stating that there, the provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act were mandatory while here,
the land use management provisions were voluntary in that a
community could choose whether or not it wanted to
participate. The rationale for this distinction was based upon
the Court's opinion that unlike the FLSA, there was a benefit to
be derived by participation in the NFIP.
Further, Judge Waddy, relying on the decision in County of
Los Angeles v. Marshall 22 by Judge Richey just a few months
earlier, found that the NFIP, as a benefit program, had "rea-
sonable" conditions attached.
Although Texas Landowners has been noticed for appeal to
the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in
July of 1978, it is significant that Judge Waddy, in his decision,
acknowledged for the first time that Congress intended the
NFIP to be a benefit program and voluntary in nature. By
suggesting that the minimum land use requirements of the
NFIP are appropriate as conditions to a federal benefit, the
Court has determined that the proper emphasis of the program
should be the federal benefit to be derived by the communities
and not the "burden" of land management criteria as suggested
by the Texas Landowners plaintiffs.
Congress apparently has not been inconsistent by rejecting
national land use but accepting it defacto through the auspices
of the NFIP. The courts have remained consistent by
concluding that the land use provisions of the NFIP are
reasonable conditions to a federal benefit. Thus, the question
of whether the NFIP is really national land use in disguise, must
be answered: "no."
11 See: Texas Landowners Rights Association, et al. v. Harris, Civ. Action No.
77-1962 (D.C.Cir.)
21 442 F.Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977)
Behavioral Study of Justice
Goldberg and the Supreme
Court
For the period of 1962 to 1969, the United States Supreme
Court has been accused of "judicial activism" and of lacking
"judicial self-restraint." Supporters of self-restraint have
accused the Justices of overstepping their authority, of making
themselves into super-legislators, and of revealing to the public
that the decisions which judges pass down are based on perso-
nal prejudices and not some higher dictates, such as those of
natural law. The "Warren Court" of 1962-1969 is recognized as
having been in the vanguard of social progress for it was well
ahead of the popularly elected branches of government - the
legislative and executive- and even public opinion in such areas
as equality of all citizens and the rights of individuals.
Chief Justice Earl Warren and his colleagues led a new revo-
lution in judicial review. They followed almost precisely the
guidelines which Chief Justice Harlan Stone set out for future
Court action in the famous Caroline Products "Footnote."
Stone listed the areas in which the Court should intervene to
be: (1) the First Amendment freedoms because these were pre-
ferred freedoms important to democracy, (2) cases dealing
with minorities because their rights are most likely to be over-
looked in a government by majority rule, and (3) where the
political process is corrupt, for then there is no other recourse
available. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938).
This was the Court on which Justice Arthur Goldberg
served. In the three years he was an Associate Justice,
Goldberg participated in some of the Court's most important
decisions involving judicial activism. Consistently, these were
egalitarian in nature and reflected an acceptance by the intel-
lectual elite of the need for human dignity and equality.
Immediately upon his arrival, Goldberg associated himself
with the activist position on civil liberties cases, often expres-
sing his views on what he felt should be the proper role of the
Court. He asserted that the Courts should take a harder look
at the facts of the case before it and measure these facts against
the commitment of the Constitution to equality and justice
under the law. Stare decisis, he felt, placed an undue burden on
the Court. In a speech given to the Hastings College of Law,
Justice Goldberg illustrated these convictions when he said
"And if, as future advocates, you want a tip from me, spend
more time on your facts than on your law in arguing before our
Court. What you can bring to bear is that infinite detailed know-
ledge of your case and your conviction as an advocate of having
a case that your client is entitled to win."'
THE EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS ON
THE JUDICIARY
While an activist Warren Court operated as a separate force
in government, the complexion of its membership was greatly
influenced by political and personal dynamics within both the
judicial and, most formidably, the executive branches.
'Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., The Defenses of Freedom (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 134-5.
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President Kennedy nominated Goldberg to the position of
Associate Justice in August of 1962, following Felix Frank-
furter's announced retirement. Formerly, Kennedy had con-
sidered Goldberg for a position on the Court several months
earlier when Justice Charles Whittaker resigned. However,
Kennedy chose Byron "Whizzer" White to fill the vacant seat.
The most obvious reason for the selection of White over
Goldberg was the former's close relationship with the Presi-
dent. White had been a Rhodes Scholar during the same years
as Kennedy and also served in the Navy with him.
When Felix Frankfurter decided on August 28, 1962, to step
down from the Court, Kennedy had already adequately
reviewed the possible nominees and Goldberg appeared to be
his choice. Henry Abraham in his book, Justices and Presi-
dents, says that Kennedy considered appointing his recently
designated Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
Abraham A. Ribicoff, but decided to stick with the qualities
which he knew Goldberg possessed. Frankfurter and Warren
were consulted by the President about the nomination and
both gave their wholehearted support. Goldberg had no
trouble winning approval in the Senate Judiciary Committee. In
the ratification proceedings on the floor, there was only one
vote registered in opposition to his appointment. That vote was
cast by Senator Strom Thurmond without public explanation.2
Perhaps, the most important factor which led to Goldberg's
appointment was, as Attorney General Robert Kennedy
stated, that he was "his [the President's] kind of people. " 3 The
Kennedys considered Goldberg part of their political family;
they knew him well and they could be comfortable with him
personally, professionally and philosophically. Secondary to
this was the fact that Goldberg had capabilities highly
recognized in the public arena and, therefore, would fill
Frankfurter's seat nobly.
When asked what President Kennedy looked for in his
appointees, his brother Bobby made the following comment:
"You wanted someone who generally agreed with you on
what role government should play in American life, what
role the individual in society should have. You didn't think
how he would vote in a reapportionment case or a criminal
case. You wanted someone who, in the long run, you could
believe would be best. You wanted someone who agreed
generally with your views of the country."4
From this, one could presume that Goldberg's strong position
on civil liberties issues probably fulfilled Kennedy's expecta-
tions.
Abraham calls all Presidents "Court packers" in their
efforts to appoint to the Court those who are ideologically
similar to themselves. A possible explanation for each Presi-
dent's efforts to place men of political beliefs similar to their
own on the Court could be that they are subconsciously
recognizing the importance of the role of the Judiciary in our
political system. Through his appointments, the President
acknowledges the legitimacy of judicial review and its effect
upon statutory law, public policy and, most importantly, public
opinion. Therefore, the Supreme Court becomes the center of
a political game played by the Constitution's rules of appoint-
2Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appoint
ments to the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 258.
31bid., p. 253.4 lbid., p. 254.
ment, the players being the appointees for Supreme Court
seats, the President, and the Congress. Each player will, in
some way, have an effect upon the outcome of the decision-
making process of the Supreme Court, no matter how minimal.
An interesting example of the political nature of the game
involving the Court is the means by which President Johnson
obtained vacancies on the Court. In Goldberg's case, Johnson
offered him the prestigious position of United States Ambassa
dor to the United Nations, the position previously held by Adlai
Stevenson. Johnson was aware that Goldberg felt he could
help find a solution to the Vietnam situation and sweetened the
pot by implying that Goldberg would be reappointed to the
Court at some future date.- Of course, Goldberg never did get
a chance for reappointment with Nixon's victory in 1968.
TECHNIQUES FOR VOTING BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
The Study of Public Low by Walter F. Murphy and Joseph P.
Tannenhaus, discusses some of the various techniques avail-
able to political scientists in studying the attitudes of members
of the Supreme Court. Two of the more useful techniques
which are discussed are scaling (see Appendix I) and bloc
analysis (see Appendix III). Each technique uses the Justices'
votes in various cases to shed some light on the attitudes of
those Justices on specific issues.
The scaling technique was first developed by mathematical
sociologist Louis Guttman, with his system also used to some
extent in the area of psychology. A political scientist, Harold J.
Spaeth, improved upon the technique by creating what he
labelled a unidimensional cumulative scale. The term "cumula-
tive" implies that an affirmative answer to any specific question
indicates also an affirmative answer to all questions ranked
below it on the scale. In turn, "unidimensional" implies that a
single scale adequately accounts for an entire response to an
issue set.6
Glendon A. Schubert has taken the techniques developed by
Guttman and Spaeth and applied them to the decisions of the
Supreme Court in an effort to discover the attitudes of the
Justices on specific issues. In his analysis, each vote by a
Justice is considered to be a response- In constructing his
scale, Schubert used a panel of scholars to identify in which of
five categories the votes of each Justice would fall.' The five
categories Schubert uses are political liberalism, political con-
servatism, economic liberalism, economic conservatism, and a
residual category. These five categories form three actual issue
dimensions. The political categories form the civil liberties scale
or, as Schubert refers to it, the C-scale. Next is the E-scale or
economic scale consisting of the economic categories. Finally,
there is a residual issue dimension.
A 1.00 on any scale means that all of the Justice's votes
were conservative in nature. For example, it is apparent from
Appendix I that Justice Whittaker voted conservatively on all
of the economic cases brought before the Court in 1961. A 1.00
on the scale means all of the Justice's votes were liberal in
nature. Thus, a position on the scale greater than zero means
that the Justice's overall attitude on that issue dimension was
liberal.
'Ibid., p. 259.
6Walter F. Murphy and Joseph P. Tanenhaus, The Study of Public Law (New
York: Random House, 1972), p. 128-9.
7Ibid., p. 118.
Schubert identifies the subcomponents of political liberalism
as voting in favor of political equality, political freedom,
religious freedom, the right to fair procedure, and the right to
individual privacy. The subcomponents of economic liberalism
are votes in favor of fiscal claims, government regulation of
business, the union in union-management disputes, freedom of
competition, and the constitutionality of state taxation. A vote
against any of these particular issues would be considered con-
servative. After breaking down each Justice's particular
response pattern, Schubert gave it a position on the scale from
-1.00 to 1.00.
By using the scales developed by Schubert, the differences
between the judical attitude of Justice Frankfurter and his
replacement, Justice Goldberg, become more evident. The E-
and C-scales, which are used for the purpose of comparing the
judicial attitudes, are shown in Appendix I. According to the
scales of Schubert in The Judicial Mind, Frankfurter ranked
fairly high on the C+ side in his earlier years but, as the attitude
of the Court became more liberal, his ranking fell rapidly to a C-
position. During his final term on the court, Frankfurter was
given a position of -0.69 on the C-scale and -0.56 on the E-scale.
This meant that in well over fifty percent of his votes, Frank-
furter decided against the liberal position in civil liberties and
economic cases. Goldberg's civil liberties stance was the
important change he brought to the Court.
Designing a coordinate system as in Appendix II with the C-
scale as the ordinate and the E-scale as the abscissa, each
quadrant can be labeled with a judicial attitude. Schubert did so
using the following reasoning:
What does being politically conservative have in common
with being economically liberal? Both attitudes require a
respondant to have little sympathy for claims of either
economic, political or religious freedom, but instead to
believe strongly in the necessity for upholding the authority
of the government in cases in which "law and order" -with
the emphasis upon "order"- conflict with petitioners' claims
to be free from enforced regulation of their behavior in
regard to questions of belief, conscience, and economic
competition. Such a person believes that society should be
protected against the possibility of repetitive depradations
by socially maladjusted individuals, while his opposite
believes that it is preferable that a guilty person be freed
rather than risk having an innocent person falsely
convicted. Conflict between freedom and authority is
perhaps the most fundamental of political issues, and it
certainly does no violence to the usual understanding of
political philosophers for us to assume that an ideological
dimension of this content represents the political factor in
Supreme Court decision-making.8
The above rationale was given to describe the authoritarian
and libertarian quadrants respectively. About the individualist,
Schubert says,
If we ask what economic ideology is reflected by attitudes of
what is conservatism in economics but liberalism in politics,
the writings of Mill and Spencer come readily to mind; and if
'Glendon A. Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of
Supreme Court Justices 1946-1963 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1965), p. 200.
we think of counter-ideology to economic and political
laissez-faire, Karl Marx is the obvious spokesman. But the
content of liberal ideology has been transformed; the man
who today believes with equal staunchness in the log-cabin
myth of political liberty and in the Horatio Alger myth of
rugged individualism is something of an anachronism; he is a
Nineteenth (not a Twentieth) Century liberal. We may well
call him an Individualist and his counterpart (in the opposite
direction of this dimension) a Collectivist. 9
As can be seen, Justice Goldberg by taking the liberal position
in the majority of political and economic cases falls into the
liberal quadrant in Appendix II. Frankfurter, on the other hand,
falls into the quandrant of a conservative. This serves to point
out the differences in the two men's ideological approaches to
the cases brought before them.
The change in judicial attitudes emphasized earlier was also
reflected in a change in the bloc structure of the Court which is
shown by Appendix III. The blocs on the Court are representa-
tive of eighty percent agreement. On Court 60, the Court from
the appointment of Stewart in 1959 through to the 1962 term,
there exist two important blocs, a conservative bloc, consist-
ing of Harlan and Frankfurter with a high-level of agreement by
Whittaker, and a liberal bloc, consisting of Black, Warren,
Brennan and tentatively Douglas. Douglas disagreed most
frequently with Brennan and agreed most frequently with
Black. From the 1962 term of the Court to the 1965 term or
Court 61 inclusive, only one bloc existed using the eighty
percent criteria for bloc formulation. Essentially liberal, this
bloc consisted of Douglas, Warren, Brennan and Goldberg.
It is apparent from this data that the appointment of
Goldberg changed not only the balance of the Court towards
liberalism on civil liberties (Appendix I), but also strengthened
the liberal bloc of the Court (Appendix III). The loss of Frank-
furter removed any semblance of a cohesive conservative bloc
on the Court. There are many civil liberties cases where a C+
vote was won by a 5-4 majority on Court 61 because of Justice
Goldberg's addition to the liberal bloc.
For instance, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963), a case for which Goldberg wrote the majority opinion,
held that a person could not be deprived of his right of citizen-
ship without due process of law. In another 5-4 decision,
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Court said that
a Washington state law allowing for a test of frivolity was inade-
quate to override the right of an indigent defendant to a trans-
cript for use in his appeal. Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), is yet another civil liberties
case decided in favor of the First Amendment right to associa-
tion by a 5-4 majority in an opinion by Justice Goldberg. The
most important of the 5-4 majority cases won by the liberal bloc
was Escobedo u. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), forerunner to
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Court
overturned a conviction for murder passed by a lower court
because the plaintiff, Escobedo, was not allowed to see
counsel when he requested it and was not notified of his right to
remain silent.
In civil liberties cases, Goldberg took a strongly positive
liberal outlook (Appendix I). In his opinions constituting civil
liberties issues, he was in favor of (1) racial equality, Watson v.
91bid., p. 201.
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City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963), and Bell v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 226 (1964), (2) freedom of the press, New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), (3) religious freedom, Abington
School District u. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), (4) fair
procedure rules for ciminal trials, Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487 (1963), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and
United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964), (5) the right to
privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and (6)
government restriction in search and seizure cases, Rugendorf
v. United States, 376 U.S. 537 (1964) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964).
On economic issues, Goldberg seemed less liberal than his
colleagues on the Court, leaning more strongly towards the
moderate position. The approach taken by Goldberg in these
matters was one of give and take and to recognize, and
balance, the needs of both parties to the litigation. The union
cases in which he participated are a vivid example of this
approach. Goldberg's position on claims of injured workers
was essentially conservative. Consistently, he voted against
the injured worker because of his conviction that an employer
could not possibly check all of the nooks and crannies of his
property for safety, Schenker v. B&O Railroad Co., 374 U.S. 1
(1963). Hence, this balancing approach to major labor issues
and a conservative outlook on Federal Employers Liability Act
(F.E.L.A.) cases contributed to the moderate rating Schubert
gave Goldberg on the E-scale (Appendix I).
THE IMPACT OF GOLDBERG'S APPOINTMENT TO
THE COURT
On the role of the Supreme Court in American society,
Frankfurter was the great commentator on "judicial self-
restraint." He was of the opinion that the judicial branch should
only intervene when it was absolutely necessary to protect the
freedom safeguarded by the Constitution. Rather than inter-
vene, Frankfurter believed that, in most cases, the Court
should defer to the state legislatures. Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
Goldberg's view is quite the opposite on judicial review.
Regarding "judicial activism" and "judicial self-restraint," he
said,
"A judge may believe that under the Consitition a court
without a jury may not adjudge guilty a defendant charged
with a serious criminal contempt. Is he a liberal or a conser-
vative? Is he an activist or a believer in judicial restraint?"1 0
He thus felt that the labels "judicial activism" and "judicial
restraint" were convenient but misleading. Still, he took a
major role in pushing for a Court decision on the issue of the
death penalty and in suggesting the Ninth Amendment as a
constitutional source of the right of privacy. Rudolph v.
Alabama,375 U.S. 889 (1963), and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). Frankfurter and other supporters of
"judicial self-restraint" would be likely to consider Goldberg's
position one of a judicial activist.
As a Supreme Court Justice, Goldberg performed a very
important role in American society. As a former Secretary of
Labor, he brought a special ability in labor law with him. He also
helped the Court in its effort to find a legal rationale for incor-
porating rights of freedom and equality into the Constitution of
the United States. Griswold involved a revolutionary new
approach to the Ninth Amendment and in Rudolph, Goldberg
wrote a dissent on a denial of certiorari in which he said that the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment makes capital punishment unconstitutional. In an effort
at clarity, Goldberg attempted to simplify the rulings of the
Court, as in New York Times v. Sullivan.
As a judicial activist and a liberal, Goldberg's appointment
had a major impact on the movement of the Court and Ameri-
can Constitutional Law into the difficult problems of justice,
equality and freedom. This put the Supreme Court in the van-
guard of those who were leading the nation toward egalitarian-
ism, perhaps the most pervasive social doctrine of the 1960's.
-David Hanley
IuMoynihan, p. 151
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Interagreement Matrix (Court 60)
Appendix I
C-scale
1962 TERM
1.00 Douglas
.95 Black
.87 Warren
.69 Brennan
.28 Goldberg
-.10 White
-.69 Stewart
-.74 Harlan
-.95 Clark
individualism 1.00 C+ Black liberalism
Douglas Warren Brennan Stewart
.5
E- -1.00 .5 E+ 1.00
Whittiker
Source: Schubert, Glendon, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes
and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963 (1965),
p. 111-2.
E-scale
1962 TERM
.82 Black
.65 Douglas
.59 Warren
.35 Brennan
.29 Clark
-.18 White
-.56 Goldberg
-.82 Stewart
1.00 Harlan
Frankfurter Harlan conservatism -1.00 C Clark
authoritarionism
1962 TERM
individualism C+1.00 Douglas liberalism
Black Warren Brennan Goldberg .5
E- -1.00 -.5 Stewart White .5 E+ 1.00
-.5
Harlan conservatism C-1.00 Clark
authoritarianism
Source: Schubert, Glendon, pp. 137-8.
1961 TERM
Black
Douglas
Warren
Brennan
Stewart
Whittaker
Frankfurter
Harlan
Clark
Appendix II
1961 TERM
1961 TERM
Douglas
Warren
Black
Clark
Brennan
Stewart
Frankfurter
Harlan
Whittaker
FORUM
Appendix III
Interagreement Matrix (Court 60)
Do BI Wa Br St Cl Whit Ha Fr
Douglas -- 81.4 79.2 75.2 53.5 53.6 43.8 42.2 41.0
Black 81.4 -- 88.6 80.0 57.0 63.0 50.0 51.2 49.7
Warren 79.2 88.6 -- 89.4 65.6 70.2 54.5 55.6 54.2
Brennan 75.4 80.0 89.4 -- 72.5 72.1 59.4 62.5 60.7
Stewart 53.5 57.4 65.6 72.5 -- 76.0 79.5 78.8 76.8
Clark 53.6 63.0 70.2 72.1 76.0 -- 75.2 76.2 75.3
Whittaker 43.8 50.0 54.5 59.4 79.5 75.2 -- 78.7 79.3
Harlan 42.2 51.5 55.6 62.5 78.8 76.2 78.7 -- 87.6
Frankfurter 41.0 49.7 54.2 60.7 76.8 75.3 79.3 87.6--
-80% Agreement Bloc
-- Tentative agreement with Bloc
Interagreement Matrix (Court 61)
Do Wa Br Go BI Whit Cl St Ha
Douglas -- 84.6 82.4 80.0 79.7 70.5 64.6 62.0 44.6
Warren 84.6 -- 95.0 87.8 82.3 80.8 73.5 70.5 50.6
Brennan 82.4 95.0 -- 89.0 81.2 84.2 75.6 74.0 54.2
Goldberg 80.0 87.8 89.0 -- 76.8 75.6 66.3 72.0 53.0
Black 79.7 82.3 81.2 76.8 -- 74.8 64.8 62.0 45.3
White 70.5 80.8 84.2 75.6 74.8 -- 76.9 76.9 66.2
Clark 64.6 73.5 75.6 66.3 64.8 76.9 -- 71.2 69.7
Stewart 62.0 70.5 74.0 72.0 62.0 76.9 71.2 -- 72.1
Harlan 44.6 50.6 54.2 53.0 45.3 66.2 69.7 72.1 --
-80% Agreement Bloc
Source: Inter- University Consortium for Political Research
There are two agreement blocs on Court 60. The bloc
consisting of Black, Warren and Brennan can be considered to
be a liberal bloc because of their position on the 1961 term
scales in Appendix I. Harlan and Frankfurter made up the
conservative bloc. In addition to this, Douglas and Whittaker
can be considered as tentative members of the liberal and
conservative blocs, respectively, because their agreement with
the members of their respective blocs is nearly eighty percent.
Addendum to the Baltimore
City States Attorney's
Office: The Sex Offense
Task Force
Statistics tend to show that of all sexual assualts that occur in
Baltimore City, only a portion of these are even communicated
to police authorities. For example, in a recent year, while 485
rapes were reported to the Baltimore City Police, City, Mercy
and University Hospitals reported treating over 900 individuals
for sexual assault. In an effort to improve the current situation,
Baltimore City State's Attorney William Swisher and Deputy
State's Attorney Mary Ann Willin have recently succeeded in
procuring a one year renewable $113,000 grant from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) for the
purpose of organizing and operating a Sex Offense Task Force
Unit within the Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office.
The Task Force, which became operational in October of
this year, will be headed by Assistant State's Attorney Edwin
Wenck.
The primary task of the Sex Offense Task Force Unit will not
only be to prosecute all sexual assaults in Baltimore City, but to
place special emphasis on reducing the high incidence of unre-
ported rapes through a co-ordinated effort involving both
Baltimore City Hospitals and Baltimore City Police Depart-
ment.
Recognizing that the rape victim has special needs and prob-
lems which have long been ignored, the Sex Offense Task
Force Unit will work closely with medical and police agencies to
improve and humanize the screening and processing of rape
victims once the rape has been reported. Three Assistant
State's Attorneys, who will be working exclusively with the
Task Force, will be on 24-hour call seven days a week to re-
spond to any rape in Baltimore City. From the moment the
prosecutor responds to the call, he is responsible for that case
and he will stay with the case until its judicial conclusion. By his
immediate and sole intervention into the assault case, it is
hoped that the prosecutor will be able to generate the rapport
and trust between himself and the rape victim which is so
crucial to the recovery of the victim and the successful prose-
cution of the case. Hence, the victim will regard the state more
in terms of a single personality concerned about his/her wel-
fare rather than a cold insensitive prosecutorial bureaucracy
that has often been counter-productive to successful prosecu-
tions.
The Sex Offense Task Force Unit has outlined other goals as
well. First, the Task Force seeks to improve and standardize a
comprehensive method for collecting evidence in rape cases by
working closely with medical and police personnel involved in
the victim intake process. Secondly, it is expected to have
some prosecutorial input into the drafting of legislation per-
taining to sexual assault. Thirdly, the Sex Offense Task Force
will serve an educational function, counseling local citizen
groups and schools as to rape prevention and reporting. Any
group interested in having a speaker from the Sex Offense
Unit should contact Mr. Edward Wenck at the Baltimore City
State's Attorney's Office.*
-Ron Byrd
*(301) 396 5040
